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THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN THE NEW
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Peter Kresdk*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORY
The Constitution of the Slovak Republic (Constitution) went into
effect on October 1, 1992, the day of its proclamation.' The decisive
J.D., Ph.D; Associate Professor at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovak Republic;
Vice-director of the Institute of International Relations of Comenius University and adviser to
the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic; Member of editorial staff of PRAVNY OBZOR, a
scientific law review in the Slovak Republic, and former contributor to the project "East Euro-
pean Constitutional Law Review," organized by Chicago University School of Law; 1988
Fulbright Scholar, University of Virginia School of Law; 1991 Fellow, Salzburg Seminar in
American Law and Legal Institutions; Nominated in 1990 by the Federal Assembly to the new-
ly created Federal Constitutional Commission; Representative for the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic (CSFR) at the 1992 "Venice Commission," a constitutional advisory board to the
Council of Europe; Nominated by the former President of the CSFR, Vaclav Havel, to the Con-
stitutional Court of the CSFR.
1. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic was printed on October 1, under No. 460/1992
Zb. (Coll. of Laws). Because the Constitution of the Slovak Republic was written for a sover-
eign republic but passed by the Slovak National Council during the existence of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic, not all its articles went into effect at the same time. Only the follow-
ing articles went into effect with the changes in the constitutional arrangement of the CSFR on
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vote on the constitutional draft was taken by the Parliament of the
Slovak Republic (National Council).2 After long and heated discussions
on September 1. The Constitution was solemnly signed by the Chair-
man of the National Council, Ivan Gasparovic, and the prime minister
of the government of the Slovak Republic, Vladimir Meciar, on Sep-
tember 3, 1992.
Notwithstanding the importance of the Constitution, its adoption
was only one among many steps which led to the dissolution of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) and the emergence of two
new sovereign states. On July 17, 1992, the Declaration of Sovereignty
of the Slovak Republic was proclaimed by the National Council3 On
the same day Vaclav Havel, President of the CSFR, resigned his post.'
On November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly5 adopted Constitutional
January 1, 1993:
-Article 84(3) (regarding the declaration of war on another state and the election and
recall of the president);
-Article 86(k) (giving the National Council the power to declare war if the Slovak Re-
public is attacked or is bound by commitments arising from international treaties on common
defense against aggression);
-Article 86(I) (giving the National Council the power to express consent for sending
armed forces outside the territory of the Slovak Republic);
-Article 102(g) (regarding the appointment of university professors and rectors and the
appointment and promotion of generals);
-Article 102Q) (declaring that the president is the commander in chief of the armed
forces);
-Article 102(k) (giving the president the power to declare martial law at the recommen-
dation of the Government of the Slovak Republic and to declare war on the basis of a decision
by the National Council of the Slovak Republic, if the Slovak Republic is attacked or is bound
by commitments arising from international treaties about common defense against aggression);
-Article 152(1), second sentence (giving appropriate authorities of the Slovak Republic
the power to abrogate constitutional statutes, laws, and other generally binding legal regulations
which conflict with the Constitution).
2. See Article 102 of the Constitutional Act of the CSFR of October 27, 1968, reprinted in
No. 143/1968 Zb. (Coll. of Laws), which stated that the Czech National Council and the Slovak
National Council were the representatives of the national sovereignty and independence of the
Czech and Slovak nations, and the supreme organs of state power in the Czech and Slovak
Republics. The National Councils were recognized as the supreme representative bodies of the
Republics and their sole legislative organs. Article 107 stated that the National Councils shall in
particular have jurisdiction to adopt Constitutional and other acts of the Republics and shall
ascertain how they are implemented by the organs and republics. Article 142 provided that the
CSFR Constitution may be amended only by a Constitutional Act of the Federal Assembly and
that both republics shall adopt their own constitutions together with the adoption of the CSFR
Constitution.
3. Approved by Resolution of the Slovak National Council on July 17, 1992, and effective
since August 28, 1992, the date of its publication. See No. 84/1992 Zb. (Coll. of Laws).
4. President Havel resigned on July 13, 1992. During his last address, he declared that he
did not intend to serve over the "liquidation" of the CSFR.
5. Article 29(1) of the Constitutional Act of the CSFR of October 27th, 1968, No.
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Act No. 542/1992, which brought about the dissolution of the Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic.
Despite the drama of these final developments, the process of dis-
solution actually began in 1968 when the former Czechoslovak Repub-
lic, established in 19186 on the ruins of the former Austro-Hungarian
Empire, was transformed into a federation of the Czech and Slovak
Republics.7 Later developments were spawned not only by the non-
democratic political environment in which the Czech-Slovak federation
was created, but by the strong centralization inherent in the former
Communist regime. Rigid centralization also found its way into the new
federal structure, constraining the functions of the new federation. Since
relatively strong powers were vested in the Federal Government,' the
component republics were prevented from developing their own identi-
ty, from developing competency to resolve issues independently, and
even from having their own constitutions. The centralized character of
the socialist "federal" state was especially illustrated by Articles 4 and
6 of the 1960 Constitution.9 Article 4 anchored the leading role in the
143/1968 Zb. (Coll. of Laws) (as amended by other constitutional acts), declared the Federal
Assembly to be the supreme organ of state power and the sole legislative body of the CSFR.
According to section 2 of that article, the Federal Assembly consisted of two chambers:
the Chamber of People and the Chamber of Nations. According to section 3, a valid decision of
the Federal Assembly required the concurrent decision of both Chambers (unless a constitution-
al act provided otherwise or unless an internal matter of only one of the two Chambers was
involved). According to Articles 30 and 31, the Chamber of People consisted of 200 members
elected by direct vote in the whole CSFR and the Chamber of Nations consisted of 150 Mem-
bers, 75 of whom were elected by direct vote in the Czech Republic and 75 by direct vote in
the Slovak Republic.
6. The Czechoslovak Republic was formally constituted by the Act of the National Coun-
cil concerning creation of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague, later published under No.
11/1918 Z.z. a.n. (Coll. of Laws). This document was described as the first "temporary con-
stitution" of the Czechoslovak Republic.
7. The Constitutional Act of the CSFR was approved on October 27, 1968, and published
under No. 143/1968 Z.z. (Ustavny Zakon c. 143/1968 Zb.). Czechoslovak Constitution of 1968,
reprinted in Blaustein and Flanz, Constitutions; Czechoslovakia.
According to Article 29, the Federal Assembly was the supreme organ of state power and
the sole legislative body of the CSFR. The Federal Assembly had the jurisdiction to enact the
CSFR Constitution and other acts (art. 36). The enactment of the Federal Constitution required
a three-fifth majority of all the Members of the Chamber of People, a three-fifths majority of all
the Members of the Chamber of Nations elected in the Czech Republic, and a three-fifths ma-
jority of all the Members of the Chamber of Nations elected in the Slovak Republic (art. 41).
See id.
8. Formally, the Constitutional Act of the CSFR was divided between exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the CSFR (art. 7), joint jurisdiction of the CSFR and the two republics (arts. 8 & 10-
28a) and exclusive jurisdiction of the CSFR (art. 9), which was formulated negatively ("matters
which have not been specifically placed under the jurisdiction of the CSFR shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic").
9. The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of July 11, 1960, published as
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government for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. ° Article 6
created the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks as a people's alliance
led by the Communist party which unified all political parties, associa-
tions and people's organizations."
As a constitutional time-bomb ticked, the supermajority require-
ment of Article 4112 and "the prohibition of majoritarian rule" in Arti-
cle 42" stifled democratic action. Article 42 required the Czech and
Slovak components in the Chamber of Nations to vote separately for
each important piece of legislation. 4 A bill was approved only if
Constitutional Act No. 100/1960 Zb. (Coll. of Laws), later amended by the Constitutional Law
of the Czechoslovak Federation and published under No. 143/1968 Z.z. and other constitutional
acts.
10. See Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Article 4, which holds that the
guiding force in society and in the State, and the vanguard of the working class, is the Commu-
nist Party of Czechoslovakia, a voluntary militant alliance of the most active and most politi-
cally conscious citizens from the ranks of the workers, farmers and intelligentsia.
11. See Ostava [Constitution] art. 6 (S.R.), which states that the "National Front of Czech
and Slovaks, in which the people's organizations are associated, is the political expression of
the alliance of the working people of town and country, led by Communist Party of Czechoslo-
vakia."
12. Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 Zb. (Coll. of Laws), art. 41 states that:
The enactment of the Federal Constitution, of Constitutional Acts of the Fed-
eral Assembly and their amendments, the election of the President of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and decisions declaring war shall require
a three-fifths majority of all the Members of the People as well as a three-
fifths majority of all the Members of the Chamber of Nations elected in the
Czech Republic and a three-fifths majority of all the Members of the Cham-
ber of Nations elected in the Slovak Republic.
13. Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 Zb. (Coll. of Laws), art. 42(1) states that:
In Cases where under the present Constitutional Act majority rule is prohibit-
ed, Members elected in the Czech Republic and Members elected in the Slo-
yak Republic shall vote separately in the Chamber of Nations. A decision
shall be adopted in an affirmative vote cast by a majority of all Members
elected in the Czech Republic and a majority of all members elected in the
Slovak Republic, unless the present Constitutional Act requires a qualified
majority.
14. Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 Zb. (Coll. of Laws), art. 42(2) states that:
Majority rule shall be prohibited with respect to the approval of
a) a Bill concerning the acquisition and loss of Czechoslovak citizen-
ship,
b) medium term state plans of development of the national economy of
the Czech and Slovak Federal republic,
c) Bills governing the matters specified in Article 10 (2) [principles of
national economic planing as the uniformly organized process of forming and
securing plans and of controlling their implementation-P.K.),
d) Bills determining the method of securing the receipts of the Federal
Budget, relations between the Federal and Republican Budgets, as well as the
principles of administering the Budget,
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adopted by a majority of the elected representatives of each Republic.
These articles, originally intended as a protection of the equality princi-
ple among constituent states, caused no particular problems during
communist rule. However, they proved to be significant obstacles to the
decision-making process of a parliament which consisted of democrati-
cally elected representatives from different political parties within a
pluralistic society.
After 1989, the newly formed democratic political powers began a
process of rebuilding not only the social order, 5 but also the 1968
e) Federal Budget and the final budgetary accounts of the Federation,
f) Bills establishing special-purpose funds tied to the Federal Budget,
g) Bills governing the questions listed in Article 11 (7) (general prin-
ciples of allocation and amortization policy-P.K.)
h) Bills determining taxes, returns and duties under Article 12 (2) (en-
terprise taxes and returns, the turnover tax, the pension tax, the agricultural
tax, the income tax, the tax on artistic and literary activities, the motor vehi-
cle tax, the road tax, the tax on income of the population and the taxation of
banking and insurance institutions, the charges which by their character had
an exclusive or almost exclusive relationship to other countries or were relat-
ed to the exercise of the jurisdiction of Federal organs-P.K.)
i) Bills governing the questions listed in Article 13 (2) (custom service,
custom policy and the issuance of customs tariffs-P.K.)
j) Bills regulating the Czechoslovak currency and the Acts specified in
Article 14, (2) (the status duties and responsibility of the Czechoslo-/ak State
Bank as well as the method of its administration, the status and legal relations
of other banks-P.K.)
k) Bills governing the questions listed in Article 15 (principles govern-
ing the price policy and price control, determination of the prices of raw
materials, products and services-P.K)
1) Bills relating to economic relations,
m) Bills governing the questions listed in Article 21(2) and Article
22 (scientific, technological and investment policy, sphere of labour, wages
and social policy-P.K)
n) Bills governing the establishment, the legal status and method of
management of economic organizations,
o) Bills enacted under Article 27 (2) Article 28 as well as Article 28a
(division of jurisdiction between the CSFR and the two Republics in matters
of internal order and security-P.K),
p) Bills establishing Federal organs of state administration with the
exception of ministries.
(3) Majority rule shall not apply to the approval of statements of
policy of the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and to
votes of confidence in the Government.
15. The leading role of the Communist Party was abolished. Constitutional Act No. 46/1990
Zb. (Coll. of Laws) introduced a prohibition of "imperative mandate" (stating that deputies are
representatives of citizens and should execute their mandate personally according to their con-
science and conviction and are not bound by orders; Constitutional Act No. 100/1990 Zb. (Coll.
of Laws) exchanged the only recognized socialist ownership by equality of all forms of owner-
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communist federation."6 Despite the fact that the Czech and Slovak
Federation was constitutionally built on the equality principle and the
voluntary bond of both republics, 7 some Slovaks still felt disadvan-
taged and accused the federal government of a strong centralization
which heavily favored the Czechs. Voices from the Slovak Republic
calling for a new arrangement of mutual relations within a federation
were opposed by widely divergent groups. On the one hand there were
politicians, especially in the Czech Republic, who stressed the need for
a strong federal government during a time of economic and political
transition; this group refused to consider a serious redistribution of
governmental power. On the other hand there were politicians, mostly
in the Slovak Republic, who supported the split of the federation and
the creation of two sovereign nations.
A new arrangement of mutual relations between the federal gov-
ernment and the national governments appeared to be of crucial impor-
tance not only for the contents of the proposed new federal and state
constitutions, but also for the future of the whole federation as well.
During the second half of 1991, after more than a year of negotiations
on different levels, the Joint Commission appointed by the Czech Na-
tional Council and the Slovak National Council considered proposals
not only for redistribution of powers but also for a new constitutional
foundation of the common state. 8 In spite of the many problems, on
February 8, 1992 the Commission approved in Milovy 9 the so-called
"Draft Treaty on the Principles of the Constitutional System of the
Common State."'2 The Czech National Council ratified this treaty on
ship. New acts were passed concerning political parties (No. 15/1990 Zb. (Coll. of Laws)), the
right to association (No. 83/1990 Zb. (Coll. of Laws)), the right to assembly ( No. 84/1990 Zb.
(Coll. of Laws), and right to petition (No. 85/1995 Zb. (Coll. of Laws), to mention just a few.
The whole process was concluded on January 9, 1991 by approval of the Constitutional Act
(23/1991 Zb.), declaring the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
16. One of the most important steps in this direction was Constitutional Act No. 556/1990
Z.z. (Col. of Laws), concerning the new division of jurisdiction between the federation and
republics ("Kompetencny zakon").
17. The Constitutional Law of the CSFR, in Article 1, section 1 stated that: 'The Czech
and Slovak Republic is a federative State of two equal, fraternal nations, Czech and Slovak."
Section 2 stated that the "Czech and Slovak Republic is founded on the voluntary bond of the
equal, national states of the Czech and the Slovak nations, based on the right of each of these
nations to self-determination."
18. See, e.g., ERic STEIN, CZECHO//SLOVAKIA: ETHNIc CoNFincr, CONSTITUTIONAL Fis-
SURE, NEGOTIATED BREAKUP, University of Michigan Press (1977); Katarina Mathernova,
CZECHO? SLOVAKIA: CONSTITUTIONAL DISAPPONTMENTS IN CONSTITUTION MAKING N EAST-
ERN EUROPE 57-91 (A.E.D. Howard, ed., Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993).
19. A small village located in Moravia, at that time a part of the Czech Republic.
20. Text of the Draft Czech-Slovak Constitution Treaty, FBIS-EELI-92-031, February 14,
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February 12, 1992. However, because of its substantive and termino-
logical inconsistencies for Slovaks, the Presidium of the Slovak Nation-
al Council refused its recommendation to the Slovak National Coun-
cil. 2'
It was understood that the issue would be decided after new parlia-
mentary elections to be held on June 5 and 6, 1992.22 The electoral re-
sults on the federal as well as republican levels dramatically changed
the direction of future developments.' In spite of the fact that the for-
mer political representation had tried its best to build a workable two-
state federation, the effort failed for lack of good will to continue on
the path to a common state. Regardless of previously declared views,
the new federal parliament halted discussions of a new federal model
and replaced the former federation with two new sovereign states-the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
The disintegration was formally accomplished by a Constitutional
Law providing for the dissolution of the CSFR. The Federal Assembly,
by a qualified majority of both Chambers in accordance with Article 41
of the federal constitution, approved it on November 25, 1992. The
constitutional law declared that by December 31, 1992, the CSFR
would be dissolved.24
Since January 1, 1993 the two new successor states have appeared
on the maps of Europe. In that same year the Slovak Republic began its
struggle with the new structure of mutual relations between the legisla-
tive, executive, and judiciary branches of the government. But the con-
stitutional relations, especially between the Parliament, the President
and the Government are unusual in many respects. This article-with
1992, at 6 (citing Hospodarske Noviny, February 11, 1992) reprinting the entire text of the
document.
21. Article 121 of the Constitutional Act of the CSFR stated that when the National Coun-
cil is not in session because it has adjourned or its electoral term has expired, the competence
of the National Council shall be exercised by the Presidium of the National Council (with some
restrictions). The Presidium was elected by the National Council from among its members.
22. Another serious disadvantage of the previous federal structure was that the electoral
term of all representative bodies was the same (4 years), and the elections to the Federal As-
sembly and to the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council were held at the
same time.
23. The Civic Democratic Union (ODS), headed by pragmatic supporter of strong central-
ized government Mr. Klaus, emerged as the most powerful party in the Czech Republic. In the
Slovak Republic the newly created "populist" Movement for Democratic Slovakia, headed by
Mr. Meciar, gained the most electoral support. Both leaders became prime ministers of coalition
governments, but were still powerful enough to press their own views about future constitution-
al development of the country.
24. See generally Constitutional Law No. 542/1992 Zb. (Coll. of Laws).
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the benefit of hindsight and nearly four years of the Slovak experi-
ence-will focus on some of the most interesting features of these
relations and suggest possible solutions for the future.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT: A BASIC THEORETICAL
OVERVIEW
In jurisprudence, the terms "structure of government" and "form of
government" are understood to mean the composition, method of selec-
tion, and relationships among democratically elected parliaments, gov-
ernments, 2 and heads of state (i.e, monarchs or elected presidents).26
The methods characterizing different structures of government are
based on the selection of the executive,27 the mutual relationships be-
tween the legislative and the executive," the internal structure of the
executive,29 the position and powers of the head of state, and on other
aspects as well. The common feature of all democratic forms of gov-
ernment is that the legislative power belongs to the democratically
25. This article uses the term "Government" to refer to the Prime Minister and council or
cabinet of ministers as it is common in parliamentary systems.
26. See, e.g., PRUSAK J. A KOL., VYBRANE KAPrrOLY Z MODERNEJ TE6RIE STATU A PRAVA
(CHAPTERS OF MODERN THEORY OF STATE AND LAW) 50 (UK Bratislava 1990); FILIP, J.,
SVATON, J., ZIMEK, J., ZAKLADY STATOVEDY (FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE) § 73
(Masaryk University, Brno 1994); KATZ, A., STAATSRECHT (CONSTITTmONAL LAW) 27 (C.F.
Muller Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg 1987); MATTERN, K., GRUNDLINIEN DES PARLAMENTS
(THE MAIN CHARACrERISTICS OF PARLIAMENTS) 47-8 (Verlag Franz Vahlen GMBH, Berlin
1969); KRESAK, P., POROVNAVACIE STATNE PRAVA (COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) 216
(UK Bratislava, 1992).
27. The executive can be created by parliamentary election, see Grundgesetz [Constitution]
[GG] art. 63 (F.R.G.), by affirmation of a candidate introduced by the head of the state,
Constitucion [Constitution] [C.E.] art. 62(d), or by the affirmation of the whole government
Osaka [Constitution] art. 113 (S.R.).
28. For example, the executive might be non-responsible to the legislative branch of the
government, as in the Constitution of the United States, or responsible to the legislative branch.
The powers of the Parliament, even within the structure of the responsible executive, do not
necessarily have to be the same. The Parliament could be empowered to express no-confidence
only to the Government as a whole, see e.g., La Constitucion [Constitution] art. 49, Ustavni
Zfikon tesk Republiky [Constitution] art. 72), or it could be empowered to express no-con-
fidence to the government and to its individual members as well. See Ustava CR [Constitution]
art. 116.
29. Constitutional models by which some executive powers are vested in the President and
in which the head of the executive is the Prime Minister, used to be characterized as models
with a "dual executive." Constitutional models in which the President of the Republic is at the
same time the head of the executive used to be characterized as models with a "monistic exec-
utive." See, e.g., Lownstein, K., Zum Begriff des Parlamentarizmus (About the term of
Parliamentarism), in: PARLAMENTARIZMUS, ATHENkuM-HAIN-SCI1rrOR-HANSTEIN, 1980, s. 67;
OHLINGER, TH., VERGLEICHENDS VERFASSUNGSRECHT (COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW),
Universitdtsverlag fdr Wissenschaft und Forschung, Wien 1986, s.35.
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elected parliament. This is the cornerstone of representative democracy,
which is based on the transfer of the people's sovereignty to a represen-
tative organ: the parliament.
The present diversity of forms of government in well-developed
democratic states is due to the fact that the basic components employed
in characterizing forms of government have evolved on their own.3"
Most European authors distinguish between the following basic models:
(1) parliamentary democracies (2) presidential democracies (3) extreme
parliamentary democracies (i.e., government by parliament or govern-
ment by assembly), and (4) several mixed or differently combined
forms of government.3' Others, like Peter Perntahler of Austria, extend
this basic division even further.32
The principal difference between the two basic governmental struc-
tures-the parliamentary and the presidential democracy-lies in the
powers, position and internal structure of the Government (i.e., the
cabinet) and the head of state. Within the classical structure of a parlia-
mentary form of government, executive powers belong to a Government
headed by the Prime Minister, and the Government is politically re-
sponsible to the parliament. The Government is under the control of
Parliament and depends on its confidence. The head of state does not
compete with Parliament or the Government for political power, but
30. For more on the process of evolution of constitutional positions of parliaments, relations
between parliaments and governments and heads of states, see BAXA, B., PARLAMENT A
PARLAMENTARIZMUS (PARLIAMENT AND PARLAMENTARISM) (1924); AULARD, E., HISTOmE
POLITIQUE DE LA REVOLUTION FRANCAISE (1901); LAUNDY, PH., PARLIAMENTS IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 1989); R.N. CURRENT, T.H. WILLIAMS, F. FREI-
DEL, AMERICAN HISTORY: A SuRvEY (1965); BRAZIER, R., CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
(Clarendon Press, 1988); YARDLEY, D.C. M., INTRODUCTION To BRITISH CONSTITUTiONAL LAW
(Butterworths, 1995); BELL J., FRENCH CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (Clarendon Press, 1992);
WRIGHT, V., THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE (1989); MULLER H., KRIEGER, K.,F.,
DEnINY NEMECKA (THE HISTORY OF GERMANY); NAKLADATELSTVi LIDovt NOVINY (1995);
BENDA, E., MAIHOFER, W., VOGEL H.J., HANDBUCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTCHLAND (HANDBOOK OF GERMAN CONSTImONAL LAW) Walter de
Gruyter (1984); HOLBORN, L., CARTER, G., HERZ, J., GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
SINCE 1871 (Prague Publishers, 1970); McBAIN, H., ROGERS, L., THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF
EUROPE (Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922).
31. PRUSAK, supra note 30; FILiP, SVATON, ZIMEK, supra note 30; KATZ, supra note 30;
MATrERN, supra note 30; KRESAK, supra note 30.
32. See, e.g., P. PERNTAHLER, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE UND VERFASSUNGSLEHRE (GEN-
ERAL COMMON JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) 252 (Springer-Verlag 1986).
Perntahler considered "apparent" or "false" parliamentarism a structure which operates within
totalitarian states and thus could not be recognized as democratic. Apparent parliamentarism
could be characterized by the fact that parliament and other supreme state organs act only as a
cover for the non-democratic political structure, which does not recognize freedom of speech,
freedom of association and other basic rights and freedoms and lacks true democratic elections.
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usually represents the country in a more or less symbolic role. At the
same time, as an "arbiter" in the interplay between the Parliament and
the cabinet, the head of state holds important powers necessary for
securing the appropriate functioning of the entire constitutional mecha-
nism. These powers allow him to resolve extraordinary situations which
might emerge from conflicts between the parliament and the executive
or from internal political conflicts within the parliament.33
The presidential form of government, contrary to the parliamentary
system, is built on the principle of separation of powers and is charac-
terized by a Government which is not responsible to the Parliament.34
The executive is often described as a monistic one. This entails a con-
solidation of the functions of the head of state and the Prime Minister
in the office of the President, who is most often elected directly by the
people through universal suffrage.'
In the parliamentary form of government there exists only one state
organ deriving its legitimate position directly from the people: the par-
liament. Conversely, in the presidential form of government there are
two such state organs: Parliament and the President forming the head of
the Government. The parliamentary form of government can be de-
scribed as a vertically-structured system of mutual relations between
state organs, with the parliament at its top, and the subordinate posi-
tions of the government, and with the head of state serving as guarantor
against the failure of the system.36 The presidential form of govern-
33. The head of state, as an arbiter, can dissolve the parliament when it fails to perform its
principal duties: to form the Government or pass a budget, not when it merely encroaches upon
presidential prerogatives; or recall a Government which has lost the confidence of the Parlia-
ment. In 1993, we witnessed the importance of this power during resolution of a political crisis
in Poland, where on May 28, 1993, the Parliament expressed its non-confidence in the govern-
ment headed by Mrs. Suchocka by a margin of only one vote. In an effort to preserve the conti-
nuity of governmental policy, President Walesa preferred to dissolve the politically shattered
parliament before recalling the relatively successful government.
34. See, e.g., the relation between the legislative and executive branch of the government
not only within the U.S. CONST. but also within the VENEZ. CONST. (1811), MEx. CONST.
(1824), CONST. ARG. (1853), NIG. CONST. (1979), and PHIL. CONST. (1987).
35. The executive branch within such constitutional structures can be characterized not only
by the fact that it is headed by the President of the Republic, but also by its constitutional non-
responsibility to the legislative branch. The result is that the parliament does not have the power
to compel the government to resign through a vote of no-confidence and its deputies are not
empowered to question the government members in the Parliament at all.
36. The fact that these constitutional systems usually contain measures for resolution of ex-
traordinary situations (state of defense, serious and immediate threat of the state institution etc.)
under which some other constitutional organs could temporarily suspend the role of parliament
does not collide with its supreme position. F.R.G. CONST. art. 53a-Joint Committee; FR. CONST.
art. 16.-President of the Republic.
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ment is characterized by horizontal distribution of powers between the
Parliament and the Government headed by the president.37
Extreme parliamentary democracy might be characterized by a
concentration of state power in the parliament and an absence of pow-
ers in the head of state. The head of state has no power to intervene in
a conflict between parliament and the government, and no power to
dissolve a parliament which for some reason is unable to perform its
constitutional function.3" Such a governmental arrangement operates on
the federal level in Switzerland,39 where its disadvantages are balanced
by intensive use of direct democracy through popular referenda.
The hybrid form, consisting of different combinations and modifi-
cations of the first two models, appears to be the most widespread
variant. Examples of this form are illustrated by the chancellor principle
in Germany (in existence since 1949),' the semi-presidential form of
government in France (in existence since 1958)," and the constitu-
tional model of Austria (in existence since 1920 but significantly
amended in 1929).42
III. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
A. A Parliamentary Democracy?
Because of the basic relationship between the National Council and
the government, the Constitution of the new Slovak Republic could be
characterized as a parliamentary democracy. If characterized solely by
the categories thus far mentioned, the Constitution clearly establishes a
37. A "pure" presidential system within a democratic order is a system of mutual indepen-
dence in which the legislative branch of the government and the executive branch of the gov-
ernment have firm mandate gained through election with their own source of legitimacy. See A.
Stephan and C. Skach, USTAVNE RAMCE A DEMOKRATICKA KONSOLIDACIA: PARLAMENTNA
VERSUS PREZIDENTSKA DEMOKRACIA (Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolida-
tion: Parliament Versus Presidential Democracy) in POLrroLOGICKY CASOPIS 1/1994, PF UM
Brno, s. 48.
38. Historical predecessors of present form extreme parliamentary democracy can be traced
to "the Assembly government", as used to describe a period of so called "Long Parliament" in
England after 1640, or to "Government Conventionnel," constitutional arrangement in France
after 1793.
39. BV, Cst., Cost.Fed. [Constitution].
40. The Basic Law was adopted on May 8, 1949 and promulgated by the Parliamentary
Council on May 23, 1949 as the Constitution of the "Federal Republic of Germany."
41. The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic was adopted on September 28, 1958 by
referendum.
42. The Austrian model is characterized by directly elected and relatively powerful presi-
dents who have traditionally hesitated to take full advantage of their own constitutional powers.
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parliamentary form of government. This determination is supported by
the government's political responsibility and accountability to the Na-
tional Council43 and the separate constitutional positions of the Presi-
dent (i.e., the head of state) and the Prime Minister."
To ascertain whether all criteria of a parliamentary form of the
government are met, however, it is necessary to look more closely
especially at the constitutional position and powers of the head of state,
the constitutional position of the legislative power, the creation and
composition of the executive power, the mutual relationships between
all other mentioned state organs and the authority of the people to
exercise their power.
B. A Strong President?
The position of the National Council is fixed in the first section of
Chapter Five of the Constitution, "Legislative power."'4 The Constitu-
tion defines the National Council as the sole constituent and legislative
body of the Slovak Republic' consisting of 150 deputies elected for a
four-year period. 7 Most of the powers vested in the National Council
are mentioned in Article 86, whereas others are found in other places
within the constitutional text.' The power of the National Council to
43. SLOVK. CONST. art. 86(g) states that the powers of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic shall be mainly to debate on the governmental policy proclaimed in the Program of
the Government of the Slovak Republic, to monitor the activities of the government, as well as
to debate on votes of confidence regarding the Government or an individual member of the
Government. Article 114 (1) states that the government shall be collectively responsible for
exercise of governmental powers to the National Council of the Slovak Republic which may
take a vote of confidence at any time.
44. SLOVK. CONST. art. 101(1) states that the President is the head of state of the Slovak
Republic and art. 109(1) states that the Government consists of the Prime Minister, deputy
prime ministers, and ministers.
45. Chapter Five: Legislative Power consists of Part One-The National Council of the Slo-
yak Republic (arts. 72-92) and Part Two-Referendum (arts. 93-100).
46. SLOVK. CONST. art. 72, which stresses the unique constituent and legislative position of
the National Council within a sovereign state, could be understood as a useless residue of the
former federative state arrangement. At the same time, however, it could be understood as a
declaration of the fact that a new constitution in the future must be finally approved only by the
National Council (... the only constituent body).
47. SLOVK. CONST. art. 73 (1).
48. Most of the powers of the National Council are defined by art. 86 of the Slovak Con-
stitution, which states:
The jurisdiction of the National Council of the Slovak Republic comprises, above all:
a) deciding upon the Constitution and constitutional and other laws and
controlling compliance with them,
b) electing and recalling the president of the Slovak Republic by secret
ballot,
19961 NEW SLOVAK REPUBLIC
legislate is substantially limited, especially by Chapter Two of the Con-
stitution, "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms."
The positions of the President and the Government are defined by
Chapter Six, "Executive Power."'49 According to the Constitution of the
Slovak Republic, the executive power consists of the President and the
Government, which is headed by the Prime Minister. But at the same
time the President is constitutionally defined as the head of the
Republic, 0 the Government is defined as the highest organ of the ex-
ecutive power."' Other factors add to this confusion concerning the
constitutional position of the President within the governmental struc-
ture of the Slovak Republic. Examples of these are: the President's
political responsibility to the National Council;52 the lack of a clear
constitutional division of jurisdiction between the President and the
c) approving by means of a constitutional law a treaty on the Slovak
Republic's entering into an alliance with other states and on its abrogation of
such a treaty,
d) deciding on proposals to call a referendum,
e) voicing consent, prior to ratification, with the conclusion of interna-
tional political treaties, international economic treaties of a general nature, as
well as with international treaties whose execution requires the passing of a
law,
f) establishing ministries and other state administration bodies by
means of law,
g) discussing the policy statement of the Government of the Slovak
Republic, controlling the Government's activity, and passing a vote of con-
fidence in the Government or its members, h) approving the state budget,
checking on its fulfillment, and approving the state closing account,
i) discussing basic domestic, international, economic, social, and other
political issues,
j) electing judges, the chairman and deputy chairman of the Supreme
Court of the Slovak Republic, the chairman and deputy chairman of the Con-
stitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, and the chairman and deputy chair-
man of the Supreme Control Office of the Slovak Republic.
k) deciding on the declaration of war if the Slovak Republic is attacked
or as a result of commitments arising from international treaties on common
defense against aggression,
1) expressing consent to sending armed forces outside the territory of
the Slovak Republic.
49. Chapter Six (Executive Power), Part One, The President of the Slovak Republic (arts.
101-107); Part Two, The Government of the Slovak Republic (arts. 108-123).
50. SLOVK. CONST. art. 101 (1) states: "The President is the head of state of the Slovak Re-
public."
51. SLOVK. CONST. art. 108 states: "The Government of the Slovak Republic is the supreme
body of executive power."
52. The draft of the SLOVK. CONsT. art. 102 introduced to the Parliament contained a sec-
tion 4 which stated, "For the execution of his office the President is responsible to the National
Council of the Slovak Republic."
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Government, especially the Prime Minister;53 the vague language of
the Constitution itself in defining the powers of the President;54 and
53. According to fJstava [Constitution] art. 102(r), the President has the right to be present
at and to chair meetings of the Government of the Slovak Republic, and to demand reports
from the Government or its members.
The constitution remains silent about the role of Prime Minister if such a situation should
arise, and fails to elaborate on the constitutional responsibility of the Prime Minister for govern-
mental decisions made during such a meeting of the government.
54. Most of the powers of the President are defined by the art. 102 of the Slovak Constitu-
tion:
The President:
a) shall represent the Slovak Republic in international relations, negotiate and
ratify international agreements; he can delegate the power to the Government
or, with the consent of the Government, to individual members of the Gov-
ernment to negotiate those international agreements for which not consent by
the National Council of the Slovak Republic is required.wardly and concludes
and ratifies international treaties. He may delegate to the Government of the
Slovak Republic or, with the Government's consent, to individual members of
the Slovak Republic, the conclusion of international treaties that do not re-
quire approval by the National Council of the Slovak Republic;
b) shall receive and accredit ambassadors;
c) shall convene the constituent meeting of the National Council of the Slo-
yak Republic;
d) may dissolve the National Council of the Slovak Republic provided the
Program of the Government of the Slovak Republic has been rejected three
times within six months of the elections, in which case the President shall
hear the opinion of the President of the National Council of the Slovak Re-
public within thirty days;
e) shall sign laws;
f) shall appoint and remove the Prime Minister and other members of the
Government of the Slovak Republic, commission the heads of governmental
departments and accept their resignation; he shall remove the Prime Minister
and other Ministers in cases defined in arts. 115 and 116;
g) shall appoint and remove the principal officers of national bodies and high
officials as defined by law, university professors and presidents, and promote
any generals;
h) shall award decorations and honors, unless another authority has been
empowered by him to do so;
i) shall grant pardons and amnesty, mitigate sentences imposed by criminal
courts, decrees to terminate or not commence proceedings and to erase crimi-
nal records;
j) shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces;
k) shall declare, by the recommendation of the Government of the Slovak
Republic, a state of war, and declare war by a resolution of the National
Council of the Slovak Republic in the event of aggression by parties hostile
to the Slovak Republic or in the even that obligations under international
agreements requiring the joint defence against aggression must be fulfilled;
1) shall declare a state of emergency by means of a constitutional statute;
m) shall announce referendums;
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the division of jurisdiction between the Parliament and the Govern-
ment.
55
The effectiveness of most decisions taken by heads of states (i.e.,
presidents or monarchs) within parliamentary democracies depends on
the countersignature of the Prime Minister or of an authorized member
of the government. Through the countersignature the member of the
government accepts his political accountability for the head of state's
decision against the parliament. In this way the institution of the coun-
tersignature ensures not only the necessary level of coordination and
cooperation between the head of state and the government but the polit-
ically independent position of the head of state as well.56
In spite of this conceptual structure, the Constitution did not condi-
tion the effectiveness of any decision of the president on the counter-
signature of the prime minister nor of any authorized member of the
government. Since practically all decisions which the president is con-
stitutionally entitled to make could be understood as his prerogatives,
his position within the governmental structure might appear to be a
strong one.
But the reality seems to be entirely different. A careful reading of
the constitutional text along with a knowledge of constitutional practice
leads to the conclusion that the structure of executive power introduced
by the Slovak constitution is not only imbalanced, but creates risk of
constitutional conflicts between the President and the Government-in
particular between the President and the Prime Minister. This assertion
is especially supported by the fact that many acts of the President, in
n) may return constitutional or other bills to the National Council of the Slo-
yak Republic with his comments for consideration within fifteen days after
their passage;
o) shall inform the National Council of the Slovak Republic of the state of
the Slovak Republic and of major important political issues, and submit pro-
posals and other measures;
p) shall have the right to be present at the sessions of the National Council of
the Slovak Republic, and
r) shall have the right to be present at the meetings of the Government of the
Slovak Republic, preside over the meetings and require reports from the Gov-
ernment or from individual Ministers.
SLOVAK CONST. art. 102.
55. According to art. 86(i), one of the enumerated powers of the National Council of the
Slovak Republic is the debate on basic international political issues, but according to art.
119(g), the Government decides principal questions of foreign policy.
56. COST. art. 89 (1) (Italy) states: "No act of the President is legal unless it is counter-
signed by the Ministers who have submitted it and accepted his responsibility." Similar provi-
sions could be found the in Constitutions of the Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, and other
constitutions creating parliamentary democracy.
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practice, relate to the execution of the constitutional powers of the
Government. 7
The disadvantage of this structure is not only that it puts the head
of state into the position of a "weak power-player" against the govern-
ment, but that it makes the president constitutionally dependent on a
political majority of the parliament, rendering him powerless to secure
the appropriate functioning of the entire constitutional mechanism.
Thus, in reality the Constitution has skewed the balance of power by
creating an inordinately strong legislative branch of the government.
The subordinate position of the President to the National Council of the
Slovak Republic is illustrated by (1) the selection of the head of state
by the Council; (2) the right of the National Council to recall the Presi-
dent; (3) the inability of the President to intervene in the activities of
the National Council in the event that it is unable to fulfill its constitu-
tional duties; and (4) the constitutional conception of the exercise of
presidential powers.
C. The President's Responsibility to the Parliament
Under the Constitution the President is elected and can be recalled
by the National Council of the Slovak Republic." The selection of the
57. SLOVK. CONST. art. 119:
The Government has the power to:
a) prepare bills,
b) issue Government decrees,
c) decide the "Program of the Government" and its implementation,
d) adopt principal measures for the implementation of the economic and so-
cial policy of the Slovak Republic
e) authorize drafts of the state budget and the state closing account,
f) decide about international treaties of the Slovak Republic,
g) make decisions on principal questions of domestic and international policy,
h) to submit bills to the National Council of the Slovak Republic or commit
important measure for public discussion,
i) request the parliament for a vote of confidence,
j) grant amnesty for misdemeanors,
k) appoint and recall state officials in cases specified by law,
1) make decisions in other legally stipulated matters.
SLOVK. CONST. art. 119
58. SLOVK. CONST. art. 86(c) states that "the National Council of the Slovak Republic elect
and recall the President of the Slovak Republic by a secret ballot." Article 84(3) requires sup-
port of at least a three-fifths majority of all Deputies (90 of 150 deputies) for election or recall
of the President.
SLovK. CONST. art. 101 (2) states (partially repeating) that the president of the Slovak
Republic is elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic by secret ballot for a period
of five years, and art. 101 (3) states that three-fifths of all deputies' votes is required for the
president to be elected.
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head of state by the unicameral parliament might be justified through
that body's position as representative of the people. But this arrange-
ment is unusual, even though few other examples within Europe can be
found. 9 The fact that members of a singular chamber need not discuss
or negotiate the selection of the head of state with another group of
representatives chosen under different principles is inconsistent with the
balance of power principle, and seems to increase the influence of
political parties represented in that particular chamber beyond reason-
able limits. Neither does this method of selection meet the requirements
for the "independent" position of the head of state, which is the basis
for the parliamentary form of government.
However, even more serious problems could arise from the fact
that the Constitution of the Slovak republic introduced-next to the
traditional criminal accountability of the president'-his political ac-
countability. The Constitution did this by giving the power to recall the
head of state to the National Council." The reasons for which the
National Council might recall the president are very broadly formulated.
The Council may recall the President from office if he "is engaged in
activity directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Slovak Republic or in activity aimed at eliminating the Slovak
Republic's democratic constitutional system."62 The obvious danger of
The first President of the Slovak Republic, Michal Kovac, was elected on February 15,
1993. He was the only candidate for the second round of the presidential election and received
106 votes out of a total of 150.
59. The same solution is utilized in the Constitutions of Hungary, Greek, Turkey and the
Czech Republic; the disadvantage of such a solution is at least balanced in these countries with
the fact that the head of state is elected by bicameral Parliament at a joint meeting of both the
chambers (art. 54), which are of different character (House of Deputies and Senate). The Czech
Republic a country with the same constitutional tradition as the Slovak Republic in the 1992
Constitution has proffered a more balanced solution. The Czech president is elected by a bi-
cameral Parliament at a joint meeting of both the chambers (House of Deputies and Senate-art.
54, section 2). The chambers are of different constitutional character, vested with different
powers and fulfill other constitutional duties separately. At the same time the Czech Constitu-
tion in art. 54 section 3 stated that: "The President of the Republic shall not be responsible for
the exercise of his function".
60. According to SLovK. CONST. art. 107, the President "can be prosecuted only on charges
of high treason. The indictment against the President is filed by the National Council of the
Slovak Republic. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic decides on the indictment."
61. Article 106 states that the National Council of the Slovak Republic can recall the Presi-
dent from his post if the president is engaged in activity directed against the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or in activity aimed at eliminating the Slovak
Republic's democratic constitutional system. In such cases, the motion to recall the President
may be tabled by more than one-half of all deputies. The consent of at least a three-fifths
majority of all deputies is required for the President to be recalled.
62. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 106.
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such a vague constitutional provision-indeed the very fact that the
President can be recalled for political reasons-raises doubts about
whether the drafters of the Slovak Constitution possessed even a basic
understanding of the parliamentary form of government.63
The only protection against more frequent political misuse of Arti-
cle 106 of the Constitution is the supermajority requirement for approv-
al of a motion to recall the president. In spite of that, it is very difficult
to expect that a head of state whose future depends on the "good faith"
of three-fifths of the deputies will be able to act as an independent
arbiter in case of conflicts between the government and the legislature
or within the legislative branch of the government.'
D. Limited Power to Dissolve the Parliament
Another factor contributing to the imbalance of power between the
head of state and the parliament is the failure to give the Presi-
dent--either as his own prerogative or upon a motion of the Govern-
ment-the power to dissolve the National Council during its legislative
term. This could bring about serious constitutional problems, especially
while a proportional electoral system in the Slovak Republic brings into
the parliament many different political parties.
There are other reasons for vesting the power to dissolve the par-
liament (subject to certain necessary limitations) in the head of state,
the most important being the necessity of having a workable govern-
ment. Thus it is not surprising that within almost all constitutional
models of parliamentary democracy or its variants, articles are found
empowering the head of state-sometimes in cooperation with the Gov-
ernment-to dissolve the parliament when the need arises.'
63. The reason the drafters of the Slovak Constitution did not preserve the independent and
neutral position of head of the state (see for example the constitutional structure of Italy, Neth-
erlands, Belgium, Spain, etc.) may be explained by the content of the former "socialist" consti-
tution; art. 60 section 2 of the Constitution of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic-published as
const. law No. 100/1960 Zb.-stated that the "President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
shall be accountable to the Federal Assembly for the discharge of his office."
64. Article 106 of the Slovak Constitution is followed by provision about criminal respon-
sibility. According to art. 107 the President can be prosecuted only on charges of high treason.
An indictment against him may be filed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic, but
the case must be decided by the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.
65. The ability to dissolve parliament can help avoid a "hung" parliament, as when the par-
liament is not able to pass a vote of confidence on the Government or to approve the state
budget, or a parliament which for some reason does not represent the will of electorate.
66. See, e.g., A Magyar KoztArsasag Alketminya [Constitution] art. 28(3) (Hung.):
The Republic may dissolve Parliament simultaneously with setting the dates
for the new election if:
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In the Slovak Constitution, this issue is dealt with in a very unusu-
al manner.67 The drafters of the Constitution limited the power of the
president to dissolve the National Council to one situation: where the
policy statement of the Government is not approved three times. More-
over, the drafters limited the President's exercise of this power to the
first six months after the elections. This means that if, for example, a
political crisis emerged within the Parliament during the second year of
a four year electoral term,' there exists no constitutional organ other
than the Parliament itself empowered to dissolve the National Council
and to call for new election.69 In fact, if such a situation were to
emerge, the Parliament itself might solve it through approval of a con-
stitutional act to cut down the term for which it was elected. ° Howev-
er, the difficulty of garnering a supermajority vote for passing a consti-
a) Parliament has at least four times within twelve months during its own
mandate withdrawn its confidence from the Government, or
b) in case the mandate of the Government had ended, Parliament failed to
elect within forty days after the date of the first nomination, the candidate
prime-minister put up for the office by the President of the Republic.
See also COST. [Constitution] art. 88 (Italy): (1) The President of the Republic may dis-
solve one or both Chambers after consultation with their Speakers, and (2) He may not exercise
this right during the last six months of his term of office; See also Grundgesetz [Constitution]
[GG arts. 63, 68(1) (F.R.G): The German Federal Constitution (the Basic Law) empowers the
Federal President to dissolve the Bundestag, if after the third ballot of the Federal Chancellor
election no person receive the votes of the majority of the members of the Bundestag and art.
68 (1) empowers the Federal President, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, to dissolve
the Bundestag within twenty-one days, if a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of no
confidence is not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag. However, the
right of the Federal President to dissolve the Bundestag lapses as soon as the Bundestag, by the
majority of its members, elects another Federal Chancellor.
67. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 102(d) (S.R.), which states that the President may dis-
solve the National Council of the Slovak Republic if the policy statement of the Government of
the Slovak Republic is not approved three times within six months after the elections. Prior to
dissolving the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the President must hear the standpoint
of the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. New elections will be called
by the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic within 30 days.
68. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 73(1) (S.R.), which states that the "National Council of
the Slovak Republic shall consist of 150 deputies who are elected for a four-year term."
69. There are several examples of situations which could emerge during the electoral term
of a National Council-for example, where the parliament expresses distrust of the government
but is unable to approve a new one, where a substantive number of elected representatives
decide to leave the political party to which they were elected and create a new one, or where
the Constitutional Court declares a decision to dissolve a political party represented in parlia-
ment constitutional.
70. See Constitutional Law (77/1992Zb.). In fact, after the National Council expressed a
lack of confidence in the "second Meciar government" in March of 1994 and the new govern-
ment was created under Mr. Moravcik, it was able to pass a constitutional law cutting down the
original term and calling for a new election.
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tutional act,71 as well as the natural hesitation of elected representa-
tives to commit "political suicide," militate against the likelihood of
such a solution.
The fact that the constitutional system is not prepared for such a
situation illustrates the imbalance of the framework set up by the draft-
ers of the Constitution. Much of the control which should rightfully be
the province of the head of state is left to the legislative branch. Such a
constitutional scheme does not even create the necessary preconditions
for overcoming a "hung" parliament,72 a situation in which reestablish-
ing a workable government is considered an urgent necessity.
E. The President in Government and Parliament Sessions
As already mentioned, the Constitution subordinates the head of
state to the parliament. Indeed, the head of state is relegated to a simi-
lar position as that of the government. The most important formal dif-
ference lies with the different majority needed to recall the President
(as compared with the vote of no-confidence in the government).73 The
substantive difference lies in the fact that the Constitution empowers
the National Council to vote no-confidence in the Government at any
time,74 but in regard to the President broadly limits its discretion to the
situation mentioned in Article 106."
At the same time, the Constitution appears to alter the traditional
functional relationships between the President and the Parliament and
between the President and the Government. For example, Articles 85
and 102 of the Constitution establish the duty of a member of the
71. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 84(3) (S.R.), which states that "The agreement of at least
a three-fifths majority of all deputies is required to adopt or amendment a Constitution, con-
stitutional law, to elect or to recall the president, and to declare war on another state."
72. A "hung" parliament is a term used to describe a situation where the parliament, for
whatever reason, is unable to make a political decision.
73. See Jstava [Constitution] art. 84(3) (S.R.) which states that "[flor the purposes of
adopting or amending the Constitution, adopting constitutional statutes, electing and recalling
the President, or the declaring war on another state, the consent of a three-fifths majority of all
members shall be required." See also &stava [Constitution] art. 88(2) (S.R.) which states that a
"no-confidence vote in the Government of the Slovak Republic or a member thereof shall be
passed provided an absolute majority of all members concur."
74. See tstava [Constitution] art. 114(l) (S.R.). "The Government shall be collectively
responsible for the exercise of governmental powers to the National Council of the Slovak
Republic, which may take a vote of no-confidence at any time."
75. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 106(2) (S.R.) which states that the "President may be
recalled by the National Council of the Slovak Republic for activities against the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or a conduct aimed to destroy the democratic and
constitutional regime in the Slovak Republic."
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Government, at the request of the National Council, to participate in its
meeting or in the meeting of any of its organs76 and the right of the
President to be present at the regular sessions of the National Coun-
cil.' In the relations between the President and the Government, how-
ever, the Constitutional text goes much farther. It gives the President
not only the right to be present at the meetings of the Government, but
to preside over them and to require reports from the Government or
from its individual members-even from the Prime Minister."
But what is the real value of these rights and powers? The right of
the President to be present at regular sessions of the National Council
means little, since the Constitution grants him no right to speak at those
meetings (the only exceptions involve information on the state of the
Republic and major political issues, as outlined in Article 102(o)).79
Likewise, the value of a constitutional right of the President to preside
over regular sessions of the Government means little if the Government
is directly responsible to the National Council and not to the President.
This is because nothing in the Constitution gives the President the
means to enforce this right against the Government. In reality, any
attempt by the President to exercise his constitutional authority would
provoke conflicts over the proper roles of the President and the Prime Minister '
76. See U/stava [Constitution] art. 85 (S.R.) which states that "[alny member of the Gov-
ernment of the Slovak Republic, or any principal official of any other body of governmental
administration shall be obliged to participate in a session of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic or in a meeting of a body thereof, when requested to do so by the National Council of
the Slovak Republic."
77. See UJstava [Constitution] art. 102 (S.R.) which states that the "President...shall have
the right to be present at the sessions of the National Council of the Slovak Republic..."
78. See tstava [Constitution] art. 102(r) which states that the President "shall have the right
to be present at the meetings of the Government of the Slovak Republic, preside over the meet-
ings and require reports from the Government or from individual Ministers."
79. The President has already on several occasions witnessed dishonoured discussions of
deputies and their voting procedures in deciding whether he could speak. He has spoken in
front of vacant chairs when the opposing majority simply left the floor, showing no interest in
his message.
The same majority, headed by Mr. Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia, had alr-
eady expressed (in Parliament )no-confidence in President Kovac, notwithstanding the fact that
the Constitution does not grant the Parliament the power to vote on confidence of the President
or to move to remove the President by a simple majority decision. See Ustava [Constitution]
arts. 106, 107 (S.R.) which state that a motion to recall the President requires an absolute ma-
jority vote of all members of the National Council, to recall the President requires a qualified
three-fifth majority decision, and the President may be prosecuted only for high treason. A
simple majority vote by the Parliament on such matters was constitutionally "obsolete," and
could even be evaluated as a direct violation of the Constitution itself.
80. As a matter of fact, even more arguments could be made not to implement this right of
the President at all.
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Hopefully, deliberation on these issues will bring future constitu-
tional development. Certainly, such provisions are not typical for a
parliamentary form of the government. They are a potential source of
constitutional conflict, not only between political supporters and oppo-
nents of the president within the parliament but between the president
and prime minister as well. The political system is weakened by such a
constitutional arrangement, especially should an active president in the
future attempt to use the full range of his constitutional powers to di-
rectly influence or control the government. For all the above-mentioned
reasons, the use of these articles seems to be of questionable benefit.8
F. The President's Power to Request Reports: The Court Leaves Space
As early as 1995, the first conflict between the President and the
Government arose over the interpretation of Article 102(r) of the Con-
stitution. Two members of the Government were asked by the President
for reports on different issues. They claimed that the constitutional right
of the President to demand reports from the Government or its mem-
bers does not give the President "the power to impose on members of
the Government any kind of activities nor the power to set deadlines to
which these should be performed."" The President argued that Article
101(1) of the Constitution established the President as the head of
state, 3 and that this should be understood to mean the "head of the
whole state." He believed his constitutional position to be superior to
that of the government.84 He further argued that for practical reasons it
was necessary to understand the constitutional power of the President
81. Solutions like this one could be found more often by mixed forms of government char-
acterized by a so-called "strong presidency." Such a form is provided by the constitution of the
French Fifth Republic of 1958, but, even there, this formula caused serious problems during the
time in which the President was not a member of the strongest political party in the parliament
responsible for creating the government. See G. Burdeau, DROrr CONST1TIONNEL Er" INSTITU-
TIONS POLITIQUFS 525 (1976); See also M. Kesselman and J. Krieger, EUROPEAN POLrIcs IN
TRANSITION 195-97 (2nd ed.) (1992), and Ardent Ph., INSTITUTIONS POLMQUES ET DROIT
CONSTITIONEL, LIBRARIE DE DEROIT DE JURISPRUDENCE, EJA (1994).
82. The President in his Letter of September 2, 1995 (No. 20-1252/95) addressed the Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, asking him to take concrete action regarding a kidnapped Slovak citizen
in Austria, and to report the results.
In a letter dated November 10, 1995 (No. 0015-95/Fr), the President addressed the Min-
ister of Interior, requesting a count of citizens questioned by the Police in connection with the
affair of Petitions archs of the political party Democratic Union.
83. See Jstava [Constitution] art. 101(1) (S.R.) which states that the President is the head
of the Slovak Republic.
84. See Constitutional Court of the SR resolution I., US 39/93 (1993), which reached a
similar conclusion.
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"to demand reports from the Government and its members" as enabling
him to demand new reports, not merely those already prepared by the
government for other purposes. Thus his demands for reports could not
be interpreted as imposing unconstitutional duties on the government or
its members. In addition, the President argued that the power to set
reasonable deadlines for Government reports was implicit in the power
to demand reports. Otherwise, a member of the government could delay
submission of a report until the mandate of the Government had ex-
pired. If this were allowed to happen, the original intent of the Consti-
tution would be frustrated.
On June 11, 1996, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic
(Constitutional Court)85 decided that Article 102(r) does not give the
president the right to fix ways and means through which the Govern-
ment or its members gather information necessary for the reports to the
President; nor does it grant him the right to fix deadlines for sending
reports to the President. In addition, the Constitutional Court ruled that
the appropriate deadline depends on the time which the Government or
its member "objectively needs" for getting all information necessary for
the report requested by the President.
8 6
In light of the need for mutual cooperation between the president
and the government, the Constitutional Court has avoided rendering
clear answers on important general issues: how can the constitutional
rights of the president under Article 102(r) be secured? And what is the
specific authority of the president when taking part in the meetings of
the government and presiding over them? These questions remain un-
solved, and the danger of constitutional conflict between the president
and the government still looms.
G. The President and the Government
As already mentioned, the language of the Constitution adds to the
uncertainty over the nature of the president's constitutional authority.
Many of the provisions dealing with the powers of the President are
85. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic was created by the Constitution of the
Slovak Republic (Chapter VII. Judicial Power, Section one Constitutional Court, arts. 124-140).
The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic is an independent judicial body vested with the
authority to protect the Constitution. The Court stands aside from the system of the general j-
udiciary, for which the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic is the highest court. The Court is
composed of ten judges, who are appointed by the President of the Slovak Republic for a sev-
en-year term from among twenty nominees approved by the National Council of the Slovak
Republic. The judges of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic were appointed on
January 21, 1993. The activity of the Court began on March 17, 1993.
86. Constitutional Court of the SR resolution I., US 7/96, N. 229/1996 (July 11, 1996).
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vaguely formulated. Others are written in such a way that it is un-
clear whether they refer to the rights or to the duties of the head of
state. 8 Article 102,9 for example, clearly does not distinguish be-
87. An example is the term "major political issue," used in Article 102(o), which states that
the President "shall inform the National Council of the state of the Slovak Republic and of
major political issues, and submit proposals and other measures." The vagueness of the term
could be responsible for conflicts between the President and the National Council regarding the
fact that the parliament might consider "major political issues" presented by the President to be
an improper influence on its own decision-making power. Just this happened in March 1994,
when, after the President's report on the state of the SR, the Parliament expressed no-confi-
dence in the Government of Prime Minister Meciar. As a result of the fact that in his "State of
the SR" presentation the President referred to some improper practices of the Government, to
some decisions of the Prime-Minister Meciar and to the relations between the President and the
Prime-minister, Meciar's supporters later accused the President of unconstitutional exercise of
his powers.
88. See Jstava [Constitution] art. 102(f), (o), J[ (S.R.).
89. See (Jstava [Constitution] art. 102 (S.R.) which states
The President
a) shall represent the Slovak Republic in international relations, negotiate and
ratify international agreements, he can delegate the power to the Government,
or with the consent of the Government, to individual members of the Govern-
ment to negotiate those international agreements for which no consent by the
National Council of the Slovak Republic is required;
b) shall receive and accredit ambassadors;
c) shall convene the opening session of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic:
d) may dissolve the National Council of the Slovak Republic provided the
Program of the Government of the Slovak Republic has been rejected three
times within six months of the elections, in which case the President shall
hear the opinion of the President of the National Council of the Slovak Re-
public; the new elections shall be announced by the President of the National
Council of the Slovak Republic within thirty days;
e) shall sign laws;
f) shall appoint and remove the Prime Minister and other members of Gov-
ernment of the Slovak Republic, commissions the heads of governmental
departments and accept their resignation; he shall remove the Prime Minister
and other Minister in cases defined in Articles 115 and 116;
g) shall appoint and remove the principal officers of national bodies and high
officials as defined by law, university professors and presidents, and promote
army generals;
h) shall award decorations and honors, unless another authority has been dele-
gated by him to do it;
i) shall grant pardons and amnesty, mitigate sentences imposed by criminal
courts, decrees to terminate or not to commence proceedings and to erase
criminal records;
j) shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces;
k) shall declare, by the recommendation of the Government of the Slovak
Republic, a state of war, and declare war by a resolution of the National
Council of the Slovak Republic in the event of aggression by parties hostile
to the Slovak Republic or in the event that obligations under international
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tween the right of the President to act on his own initiative' and his
duty to do something on the basis of an initiative of some other consti-
tutional organ.9
When creating constitutional norms, as with other types of law, a
failure to set down clearly the modality of the performance or scope of
the rights and duties of a particular state organ creates a potential
source of conflict. Thus the construction of the aforementioned provi-
sions are a defect of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. These
deficiencies are compounded by the structure of the relationships within
the executive power.
In order to understand this aspect of the Constitution, it is neces-
sary to examine Articles 102(t)9 and 116(4). 93 By the terms of the
Constitution the President, as head of state, is empowered to appoint
and remove the Prime Minister and other members of the Government,
to entrust members of the Government with the management of minis-
tries, and to accept their resignations. The Prime Minister and other
ministers shall be removed by the President in cases stipulated in Arti-
cles 115(1) and 116(4).9' According to Article 115(1), the President
shall dismiss the Government in the event that the National Council
passes a vote of no-confidence or overrules a motion for a vote of
confidence. This is in accordance with the declared parliamentary form
of government. However, according to Article 116(4), a proposal for
agreements requiring the joint defence against aggression must be fulfilled;
1) shall declare a state of emergency by means of a constitutional statute;
m) shall announce referendums;
n) may return constitutional or other bills to the National Council of the Slo-
yak Republic with his comments for reconsideration within fifteen days after
their passage;
o) shall inform the National Council of the Slovak Republic of the state of
the Slovak Republic and of major political issues, and submit proposals and
other measures;
p) shall have the right to be present at the sessions of the National Council of
the Slovak Republic, and
r) shall have the right to be present at the meetings of the Government of the
Slovak Republic, preside over the meetings and require reports from the Gov-
ernment or from individual Ministers."
90. See, e.g., id. §§ 102(a),(b),(e) & (h).
91. See, e.g., id. §§ 102(f),(k),(l) & (in).
92. Id. § 102(f).
93. See (Jstava [Constitution] art. 116(4) (S.R.), which states that a motion for the dismissal
of a member of the Government may be presented by the Prime Minister.
94. See UIstava [Constitution] art. 115(1) (S.R.) which states that "[i]n the event that the
National Council has passed a vote of no-confidence or overruled a motion for a vote of confi-
dence, the President shall dismiss the Government." See also id.
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the dismissal of a member of the Government may also be presented to
the President by the Prime Minister.
The Slovak Constitution thus grants the power to initiate the dis-
missal of a Government member not only to the National Council but
to the Prime Minister as well. Regarding the dismissal of a member of
the government by the Parliament, the Constitution states that a vote of
no-confidence may be submitted to and considered by the National
Council provided one-fifth of the members so require. The consent of
more than fifty percent of all deputies is required to pass a vote of no-
confidence in the Government.95 In contrast, the Prime Minister may
propose dismissal of a member of the Government by merely presenting
a motion to the President; he is not even required to justify such a
motion.'
The political responsibility of the Government (headed by the
Prime Minister) to the Parliament is different in nature than the political
responsibility of the President to the Parliament. At the same time, the
President is not responsible for activities of the Government at all. The
logical conclusion, based on the traditional parliamentary form of gov-
ernment, is that the drafters intended the President to follow the motion
of the Prime Minister and dismiss the member of the Government any-
time the Prime Minister presents such a motion-the same way the
President must do when the parliament expresses no-confidence in a
particular member of the government. This idea is supported by the fact
that the constitutional position of the Prime Minister within the Govern-
ment is traditionally more than primus inter partes.9 7
95. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 88 (S.R.), which states:
(1) A vote of no-confidence in the Government of the Slovak Republic or a
member thereof may be submitted to and considered by the National Council
of the Slovak Republic provided one fifth of the members so require.
(2) A no-confidence vote in the Government of the Slovak Republic or a
member thereof shall be passed provided an absolute majority of all members
concur.
96. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 111 (S.R.) which states that:
On the advice of the prime minister, the President of the Slovak Republic
shall appoint and recall other members of the Government by granting com-
missions to carry out departmental duties. The President can appoint the
Prime Minister or a Minister from among the citizens eligible to be elected to
the National Council of the Slovak Republic.
See also id at 92.
97. See _stava [Constitution] art(s). 111, 116(5), 116(6) (S.R.) art. 111, for example, grants
the President, on the advice of the Prime Minister, the power to appoint and recall other mem-
bers of the Government and to entrust them with the departmental duties, art. 116(5) states that
if the Prime Minister resigns, the entire Government must resign; and according to art. 116(6),
if the National Council of the Slovak Republic passes a vote of no-confidence in the Prime
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Because of the Constitution's lack of clarity, it does not give suffi-
cient guidance on whether the President is obliged to follow the Prime
Minister's proposal to recall a Government member. Article 116(4) thus
creates potential for constitutional conflict. This led to a controversial
decision of the Constitutional Court as early as 1993.98 On June 2 of
that year, the Constitutional Court decided that Article 116(4) of the
Constitution does not charge the president of the Slovak Republic with
the duty to recall a member of the government, even when this is pro-
posed by the prime minister. The Court's rationale was that the position
of the president is constitutionally dominant over the position of the
Government, but not absolute. In the Court's opinion, if the proposal to
recall a Government member is submitted to the President by the Prime
Minister, the only constitutional duty of the President is to consider
such a proposal. This duty is fulfilled when the President decides to
recall or not to recall the member of the Government in question."
It is easy to recognize that this interpretation of Article 116(4) of
the Constitution influenced the relationship between the supreme state
organs in the Slovak Republic and the "form of the government" as
well. It unwisely increased the influence of the head of state in the
structure of the government. The Government, which is headed by the
Prime Minister and created after his recommendation, is politically
responsible not to the President but to the Parliament. A "strong" con-
stitutional influence of the President-who is at the same time not
bound by any constitutional provision to act as independent arbiter in
the interplay between the Parliament and the Government----creates even
more tension in the relation between the President and the Prime Min-
ister as well as between the President and the Parliament.
Minister or any member of the Government, the President shall dismiss him. The dismissal of
the Prime Minister results in the stepping down of the Government.
98. See Constitutional Court of the SR resolution N., 39/93 (June 2, 1992). See also Con-
stitutional Law (206/1993 Zb.).
The case has emerged as a consequence of a personal conflict between the Prime Minis-
ter, Mr. Meciar, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Knazko. The Prime Minister's proposal to the
President to recall Mr. Knazko from his ministerial position resulted in a serious constitutional
controversy between the President and the Prime Minister. The President, Mr. Kovac, who was
not convinced that there is a constitutional duty to follow the proposal of the Prime Minister,
has asked the Constitutional Court of the SR to interpret art. 102 let. g) of the Constitution.
Several days later, without waiting for the Constitutional Court decision, the President recalled
Mr. Knazko.
99. See Constitutional Court of the SR resolution N., 29-32/95 (1995). The entire text of
the Constitutional Court decision was printed in ZBMRKA NALEZOV A UZENESENI USTAVNEHO
SUDU SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY 1993-1994.
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H. When a Deputy Joins the Government
Article 72 of the Constitution prohibits the simultaneous exercise
of the parliamentary mandate and a government function."° Prohibi-
tion of the "exercise" of parliamentary mandates by elected members of
the Parliament who are subsequently appointed to the Government (i.e.,
incompatibility) is more close to the understanding of the separation of
powers principle as it is applied by the presidential democracy then to
the basic constitutional model of the parliamentary democracy. Howev-
er, it should be noted that compatibility of the office of a deputy with
membership in the government is not among the most important charac-
teristics of the "parliamentary form of government" to which the Con-
stitution supposedly adheres. By suspending the mandate of a deputy
during his tenure in governmental office, the Slovak Constitution strikes
much closer to the principle of incompatibility between parliamentary
and governmental positions based on the "separation of powers" and
stands much closer to the "presidential form of government" and its
derivations.' °
But through the institution described as a "dormant mandate, ' 'l""
the Slovak Constitution introduced an unusual approach to the "separa-
tion of powers" doctrine. Under this approach, a deputy appointed to
the government is not obliged to resign his mandate; but he cannot
exercise it. The mandate is temporarily filled by a "substitute."'0 3 If
the deputy who was appointed to the Government loses his governmen-
tal position-whether by recall caused by a vote of no-confidence, by
request of the Prime Minister or as result of his resignation-the substi-
tute shall withdraw and the deputy will resume exercising his mandate
again.
This solution, however reasonable it seems, raises several constitu-
tional questions. For example, where one deputy has replaced another
who is appointed as a member of the Government, there is some ambi-
100. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 77(2) (S.R.), which states that "[Tihe mandate of a repre-
sentative who has been appointed a member of the Government, though not fulfilled, shall not
expire." See also tstava [Constitution] art. 109(2) (S.R.), which states that "[A] member of the
Government shall not be allowed to hold legislative or judicial office."
101. See, for example, the "semi-presidential system" in France since 1958.
102. The phrase "dormant mandate" indicates a mandate of a representative appointed a
member of the Slovak Government which does not cease while he or she executes the govern-
ment post, but is not being exercised.
103. See Law (197/1994 Zb.) § 1, par. 48 (June 7, 1994), which states that on election to the
National Council of the Slovak Republic (No. 50/1990 including alterations and additions), a
substitute is a stand-in (reserve candidate) who was nominated on the list by the same Political
Party or coalition in the same electoral region as the Deputy first in office.
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guity concerning the continued mandate of the substitute in the event of
the Government member's resignation or dismissal from the Govern-
ment. The parliamentary behavior of such a substitute deputy is likely
to be threatened by the fact that his parliamentary term depends on his
predecessor's presence in the Government.
If such a substitute were to seriously fulfill the function of parlia-
mentary control over the Government, he might often be required at
times to work against his own mandate. However, it is very difficult to
expect such selfless behavior. In actual practice, members of the stron-
gest political parties in Parliament would not only win governmental
posts, but at the same time they would gain support of their substitutes
in Parliament and thus be guaranteed to remain in politics even in the
event of their removal from governmental posts. The real consequence
of such a constitutional provision is not only the weakening of the
mechanism of parliamentary control over the Government, but also the
strengthening of the influence of political party or parties in the Gov-
ernment.
An important constitutional question stems from the fact that the
Constitution itself states only that the mandate of a deputy who is ap-
pointed as a member of the Government does not cease while he exe-
cutes the government post; it is simply not being exercised."° The
Constitution itself does not speak about substitutes of such deputies, nor
about the possibility of creating a mandate temporarily limited by the
time the predecessor of a substitute spends as a member of the Govern-
ment. The institution of substitutes was created by a law of the National
Council."5
The Slovak Government successfully moved to change Section 2,
paragraph 48 of the Law on Election to the Slovak National Coun-
cil"°' in a way that empowers political parties to influence the choice
of parliamentary substitutes.0 7 This seems to be inconsistent with the
104. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 77(2) (S.R.).
105. See Law (197/1994 Zb.) § 5, par. 48 (June 7, 1994). The institution of such substitutes
was created by § 5, Par. 48 of Law No. 197/1994 of June 7, 1994 (altering the Law of the
Slovak National Council on elections to the Slovak National Council of March 16, 1990 No.
80/1990).
106. See Law (80/1990 Zb.) (March 16, 1990). The Law of the Slovak National Council
"[oJn election to Slovak National Council of March 16, 1990 No. 80/1990 (including alterations
and additions, stipulated in the Law of the SNC of December 3, 1991 No 8/1992; Law of the
SNC of February 25, No. 109/1992; Law of the SNC of November 5, 1992 No. 518/1992 and
Law of the SNC of June 7, 1994 No. 157/1994).
107. See Law (81/1995 Zb.) (April 7, 1995), approved as Law of the Slovak National
Council of April 7, 1995 No. 81/1995 amending the Law of the Slovak National Council "loin
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constitutionally declared principle of direct election." According to
present legal status, if a mandate becomes free for any reason during
the electoral term, the substitute (a reserved candidate) is to be chosen
by his political party from among candidates placed on the party list
not "according to the priority of his position," but "after taking account
of the profession of the deputy whose mandate became vacant." 9
Thus, the institute of deputy "substitutes" not only strengthens the role
of political parties and their leaders, but seems to work against the
declared principle of separation between the political parties and the
state."' Such an arrangement allows political parties to choose, more
or less arbitrarily, the substitute for an elected deputy. Desptite the fact
that it could be questioned on the ground of Constitutional Articles 30
and 74,"' no interested party has initiated proceedings of the Consti-
tutional Court on this question yet."
IV. THE REFERENDUM
The democratic order established by the Constitution is illustrated
by provisions which state that the power of the state derives from the
citizens, who shall exercise it either directly or through their elected
representatives"' and that state bodies may act solely in conformity
with the Constitution' . The Deputies are representatives of the citi-
election to Slovak National Council of March 16, 1990 No. 80/1990 (including alterations and
additions, stipulated in the Law of the SNC of December 3, 1991 No 8/1992; Law of the SNC
of February 25, No. 109/1992; Law of the SNC of November 5, 1992 No. 518/1992 and Law
of the SNC of June 7, 1994 No. 157/1994).
108. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 30(3) (S.R.) which states that the "right to vote shall be
exercised through equal, universal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. The terms thereof shall
be specified by law."
109. See Law (80/1990 Zb.) (March 16, 1990). Par. 48, § 2 of the Law of the Slovak Na-
tional Council on election to Slovak National Council of March 16, 1990, No. 80/1990 (includ-
ing alterations and additions, stipulated in the Law of the SNC of December 3, 1991 No
8/1992; Law of the SNC of February 25, No. 109/1992; Law of the SNC of November 5, 1992,
No. 518/1992, Law of the NC of the SR of June 7, 1994, No. 157/1994 and Law of the NC of
the SR of April 7, 1995, No. 81/1995).
110. See fJstava [Constitution] art. 29(4) (S.R.), which states that "[plolitical parties and
movements, as well as unions, societies or associations shall be separate from the State."
111. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 30(3) (S.R). See also Ustava [Constitution] art. 74(1)
(S.R.).
112. See Jstava [Constitution] art. 130 (S.R.). Under this article, the Slovak Constitutional
Court initiates proceedings on the basis of a proposal by at least one-fifth of the deputies of the
National Council of the Slovak Republic, the President of the Slovak Republic, the Government
of the Slovak Republic, the Court and the General Prosecutor.
113. See Ostava [Constitution] art. 2(1) (S.R.) which states that the "power of the state is
vested in the citizens who shall exercise it directly or through their elected representatives."
114. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 2(2) (S.R.) which states that "the state authorities shall
NEW SLOVAK REPUBLIC
zens empowered to decide issues within the jurisdiction of the National
Council,"' but the right to exercise their power directly through refer-
endum as well was reserved to the citizens." 6 The Constitution has
recognized the referendum as a means for deciding important questions
of public life" 7 in which every citizen qualified to elect the members
of the Council shall have the right to participate."'
There are two basic forms of referendum recognized within the
constitutional system of the Slovak Republic. First, there is the obliga-
tory referendum, which is utilized for confirmation of constitutional
laws (i.e.,amendments) on entering into or withdrawing from unions or
alliances with other states."9 These issues must be put directly to the
people. Second, there is the facultative form of referendum, used to
decide other issues of importance to the people.20 However, a refer-
endum cannot be held on issues of basic rights and liberties, taxes and
levies, and the state budget.12" '
Direct democracy could be characterized as the highest form of
democracy. It means not only that the most important or highly delicate
political decisions are open to a direct vote by the citizens, but also that
such decisions have priority over decisions taken by the representative
body. This understanding is broken by the highly problematic approach
of the Slovak Constitution, which puts direct democracy in second
place. The Constitution explicitly allows the National Council to amend
act only on the basis of the Constitution and to the extend and in the manner which will be
stipulated by law".
115. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 73(2) (S.R.) which states that the "members shall be the
representatives of the citizens, and shall be elected to exercise their mandates individually and
according to their best conscience and conviction. They are bound by no directives."
116. See Ustava [Constitution] arts. 93-100 (S.R.) The referendum is regulated in Part two
(The Referendum) of Chapter Five of the Slovak Constitution.
117. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 93(1,2) (S.R.) which states that "(1) A constitutional
statute on the formation of a union with other states or a secession therefrom shall be confirmed
by a public referendum. (2) A referendum may also be used to decide on other critical issues in
the public interest."
118. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 94 (S.R.), which states that "[E]very citizen qualified to
elect the members of the National Council of the Slovak Republic shall have the right to vote
in a referendum."
119. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 93(1) (S.R.), which states that a "constitutional statute on
the formation of a union with other states or a secession therefrom shall be confirmed by public
referendum."
120. See Jstava [Constitution] art. 93(2) (S.R.), which states that a "referendum may also be
used to decide on other crucial issues in the public interest."
121. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 93(3) (S.R.), which states that "[N]o issues of fundamen-
tal rights, freedoms, taxes, duties, or national budgetary matters may be decided by a public
referendum."
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or abolish the results of a referendum by means of a constitutional law,
three years after the result of the referendum comes into effect."
Even in situations where the Council's constitutional"2 authority to
override the people is not exercised, the very possibility of such an
override in Article 99 evokes the conclusion that its drafters intended to
make the parliament too powerful. The idea seems to be in opposition
to the peoples' sovereignty principle on which all democratic states
base their legitimacy.
V. CONCLUSION
The experience of the Slovak Republic since 1993 shows the im-
portance of well-balanced constitutional relations between the Parlia-
ment, the President and the Government. The drafters of the Constitu-
tion and the National Council, advised by politically oriented lawyers,
have created a governmental form which does not adhere to many of
the most important features of the parliamentary form of government
and bears some features of the first Constitution of the Czechoslovakia
(1920) and previous socialist constitutions as well.'24
The Constitution of the Slovak Republic departs from the model of
parliamentary democracy by creating an imbalanced governmental sys-
tem which vests too much power in a politically disjunctive parliament.
These modifications of the parliamentary model are ilustrated by the
facts that: (1) the head of state is elected and may be recalled by the
unicameral parliament; (2) the Constitution draws the head of state into
the everyday political processes and does not vest him with the neces-
sary powers to mitigate political conflicts; (3) the Constitution creates
relations between the head of state and the Prime Minister and between
the head of state and the Government which are likely to erupt into
constitutional conflicts.
122. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 99(1) (S.R.), which states that "[T]he results of a refer-
endum may be derogated or abrogated by a constitutional statute passed by the National Coun-
cil of the Slovak Republic once a period of three years has passed since the date the outcome
took effect."
123. The Slovak Constitution was not subject to the referendum.
124. See The first Constitution of Czechoslovakia (the Law of February 29, 1920) art. 82,
which stated that the President of the Republic shall have the right to be present at and to pre-
side over meetings of the Government and to demand from the Government and its individual
members written reports on any matter in the jurisdiction, Constitutional Law (100/1960 Zb.)
(June 11, 1960)(tR) and the socialist Constitution of Czechoslovakia (approved on June 11,
1960 and declared as Constitutional law. No. 100/1960 of Collection of Laws), for example, did
not ask for countrasignature of the acts of the President and its art. 61 (2) stated that the Presi-
dent "shall be accountable to the National Assembly for the discharge of his office."
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Other provisions seem equally unusual. Through the institution of
the "dormant" mandate, the political parties are empowered to make
decisions about the occupancy of parliamentary seats. The Parliament is
also entitled to change the results of a popular referendum. The absence
of a cohesive constitutional conception at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution is evidenced by the incorporation of a variety of solutions
from among very diverse constitutional models."z
Thus, many of the political problems the Slovak Republic has been
faced with since 1993 can be traced not only to the lack of democratic
experience of some members of the new political elite, but directly to
particular constitutional articles as well. Not surprisingly, the situation
resulted very early in an overload on the newly created Constitutional
Court. Despite the lack of experience of the Constitutional Court, as
well as constitutional imperfections which directly influence its activi-
ty" , the Court has already been able to mitigate some of the prob-
lems. But even the Constitutional Court is not-and should not
be-"'omnipotent". While some of the mentioned problems could be
partially solved through its interpretation of the Constitution" 7 the
125. The strongest influence seems to be exercised by the former socialist Constitution of
Czechoslovakia of 1960, the German Basic Law of 1949 and the French Constitution of 1958.
Along with the unusually strong constitutional position of parliamentary deputies, the
Constitution provides that if the parliament denies its consent to the criminal or disciplinary
proceedings against a deputy during his term, prosecution is ruled out forever. The fact that the
parliamentary immunity is treated by the Constitution as indemnity seems to be in clear dis-
agreement with the general understanding of principles of Equality and the Rule of Law. Article
78 (2) of the Slovak Constitution states: "No criminal or disciplinary proceedings can be ini-
tiated against a deputy, and he cannot be taken into custody, without the consent of the Nation-
al Council of the Slovak Republic. If the National Council of the Slovak Republic denies its
consent, prosecution is ruled out forever."
126. See Ustava [Constitution] art. 131 (S.R.), an example of such constitutional missolution,
reserving decisions on the compatibility of decrees issued by the Government, generally binding
legal regulations issued by ministries, other central bodies of state administration with the Con-
stitution or constitutional and other laws for the decision of a plenary meeting of the Constitu-
tional Court (consisting of 10 judges). However, important interpretation of constitutional laws
in disputed matters is left to the senates of the Constitutional Court (consisting of only three
judges).
Another example is the fact that neither the Constitution, the Law No. 38/1993 (The Law
on the Organization of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic and on the Proceedings
before this Court) nor any other law for example includes an "expressis verbis" rule on the
binding force of the judgments of the Constitutional Court. Also exemplary is the fact that no
explicit rules exist as to the procedure to be followed in cases where a petition is presented by
natural or legal persons who are the opinion that their rights and others' rights have been viola-
ted.
127. See tIstava [Constitution] art. 128(1) (S.R.) which states that the "Constitutional Court
shall be responsible for the interpretation of constitutional statutes in conflicting cases. The
terms shall be provided by law."
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most important among them must be left to the people and their elected
representatives.
